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Real estate timesharing,' although still in its embryonic stage, is
developing rapidly in the courts2 and as a subject of state and federal
regulation.' The results have helped temper timesharing's potential
inconsistencies and abuses.4 At the same time, uneven regulation
* BA., William Woods College, 1982; J.D. (expected), Washington University,
1985.
I. See infra note 5 for definitions of this amorphous concept. Timesharing is a
term adopted from the computer industry. Pollack, Time-Sharing, or Time is Money
But Will It Sell, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 281, 282 (1982). Other labels for this concept
include: time share ownership, interval ownership, fractional time period ownership,
membership club, vacation lease, and vacation license. Comment, Legal Challenges
to Time Sharing Ownership, 45 Mo. L. REV. 423, 424 n.5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Legal Challenges]; see also Block, Regulation of Timesharing, 60 U. DET. J.
URB L. 23, 23 (1982).
One can attribute the variety of labels to the many ways of structuring timesharing
programs. This Note, like the works of other commentators, refers to timesharing as a
generic term that includes both fee and non-fee ownership. See, e.g., Comment, Reg-
ulating Vacation Timesharing: A More Effective Approach, 29 UCLA L. REV. 907, 907
n 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing].
2. See infra notes 127-86, 212-37 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 61-112 and accompanying text.
4 See. e.g., M. HENZE, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF TiME-SHARE RESORTS (1982);
K ROMNEY & B. ROMNEY, CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT GUIDE (rev. ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as ROMNEY & ROMNEY]; Block, supra note 1 (provides a thorough
analysis of current regulation); Rugani, Simon & Silverman, Time-Sharing of Real
Properto, 2 REAL PROP. NEWS I (Fall 1980) [hereinafter cited as Rugani]; Comment,
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and unforeseen timesharing difficulties necessitate legislative change.
Timesharing is not susceptible to a single definition5 because it can
take many forms.' Essentially, timesharing injects a temporal ele-
ment into real estate ownership.7 It grants a purchaser the right to
Regulating Vacation Timesharing, supra note I, at 907 (author suggests that the "desire
to regulate has been the only consistent aspect of the legislative approaches to the
timesharing industry"); Podgers, Two Groups Propose Time-Share Legislation, 66
A.B.A. J. 543 (May 1980) [hereinafter cited as Time-Share Legislation].
5. Timesharing is a generic term extending to both real and personal property.
See supra note 1. "Virtually any piece of property-a house, a condominium, a hotel,
even a yacht-can be timeshared." Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing,
supra note I, at 907. Despite conceptual difficulties in defining real estate timeshar-
ing, two proposed uniform acts offer their own definitions.
The Model Time-Share Act, previously titled the Uniform Real Estate Time-Share
Act, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
defines "time share" as "time-share estate or time-share license." UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSIONERS' MODEL TIME-SHARE AcT § 1-102(13) (Proposed Official Draft
1980), 7A U.L.A. 269 (Supp. 1984) [hereinafter cited as MODEL TIMESHARE ACT].
These two terms are defined in § 1-102:
(14) "Time-share estate" means a right to occupy a unit or any of several units
during [five] or more separated time periods over a period of at least [five] years,
including renewal options, coupled with a freehold estate or an estate for years in
a time-share property or a specified portion thereof....
(18) "Time-share license" means a right to occupy a unit or any of several units
during [five] or more separated time periods over a period of at least [five] years,
including renewal options, not coupled with a freehold estate or an estate for
years.
Id. §§ 1-102(14), (18).
The Model Timeshare Act, drafted jointly by the National Timesharing Council of
the American Land Development Association and the National Association of Real
Estate License Law Officials, defines "timeshare" as "the right, however evidenced or
documented, to use and occupy one or more timeshare units on a periodic basis ac-
cording to an arrangement allocating such use and occupancy rights between other
similar users." MODEL TIMESHARE AcT § 1-103 (1983), reprinted in M. HENZE, supra
note 4, at app. 5-14. "'Timeshare plan' means the rights, obligations and program
created by the timeshare documents for a timeshare property or, in the case of a
multi-location plan, for timeshare properties." MODEL TIMESHARE AcT § 1-102(36)
(1983), reprinted in M. HENZE, supra note 4, at app. 5-14. In addition, the Model
Timeshare Act defines "timeshare property" as "one or more timeshare units subject
to the same declaration, together with any common areas of any other real estate, or
rights therein, appurtenant to those units." Id.
6. See infra notes 20-60 and accompanying text.
7. Comment, Time-Share Condominium: Property's Fourth Dimension, 32 ME. L.
REV. 181, 181 (1980). The commentator asserts that in addition to real property's
traditional three dimensions (breadth, depth, and height), timesharing offers a fourth
dimension-time. See id. at 211-12; see also Eastman, Time Share Ownership: 4 Pri-
mer, 47 N.D.L. REV. 151, 152 (1981).
In addition to a "temporal division of property," one commentator remarked that
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use and occupy real property for a fixed duration every year.
Several commentators and a few courts have examined the general
concept of real estate timesharing.' Legislators in several states used
these insights to implement timesharing regulations and statutes.9
Several aspects of timesharing still, however, present theoretical and
practical dilemmas.'O In particular, this Note examines the classifica-
tions and regulatory frameworks of timesharing,"' with special em-
phasis on the conceptual and regulatory problems inherent in non-fee
timesharing.' 2
II. TIMESHARING CLASSIFICATION
The timesharing concept originated in Europe. 3 In America, peo-
ple began to participate in timesharing programs in response to infla-
tion, economic recession, and a downturn in the housing market
during the 1970s. 1 In particular, developers rearranged their failing
condominium projects' 5 into timesharing units to prevent financial
timeshanng "lowers the threshold of real property ownership." Pollack, supra note 1,
at 282.
8. See infra notes 20-60 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 61-112 and accompanying text.
10. The continuing development of new timesharing formats compounds the con-
tinuing struggle over how to classify timesharing.
II. Attempting to "pidgeon-hole" timesharing into a particular legal classification
is counterproductive, because it strains prior common law principles and can defeat
consumers' expectations. A realistic approach examines the substance of timesharing
and why it was purchased rather than focusing upon the particular format.
12. Non-fee timesharing is also known as right-to-use timesharing and "quasi-
ownership." Some non-fee formats create a chattel real. Others, however, form a
more tenuous interest. See infra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
13. Originally, timesharing developed in the resort areas of Europe in the 1960s.
Straw, Representing a Purchaser of a Time Share, I1 COLO. LAW. 1543, 1543 (1982).
One author traces timesharing's origins to the French Alps in 1967. ROMNEY & ROM-
NEY. supra note 4, 13-4.
14. See M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 1-4; Comment, supra note 7, at 181. One article
noted that "[nlew housing starts [were] at their lowest point since World War II, but
during the past seven years the time-share business has exploded from $50 million to
$1.3 billion in annual sales." Holiday Condos, 120 TiME, Aug. 16, 1982, at 54.
15. Timesharing extends beyond condominium conversions. Other facilities, such
as motels, campgrounds, yachts, houseboats, cruise ships, and recreational vehicles,
are subject to timesharing. See Before You Buy Your Week at That Condo-, 93 U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., July 19, 1982, at 45 [hereinafter cited as Before You Buy]; see
also Curtis, Endless Vacation or Endless Headache, 128 FORBES, Sept. 14, 1981, at
114. In addition, some developers build timesharing projects from the ground up.
See id.
1984]
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lOSS.16 Consumers quickly purchased the timesharing offerings 17 for
two principal reasons: to decrease vacation costs' 8 and to own a va-
cation unit only for the periods of use. 19
Timesharing comes in a variety of formats.2 ° Some distinctions
merely offer a variation of nomenclature z.2  Others create diverse op-
erational and legal consequences.22 Generally, commentators
broadly categorize timesharing as fee ownership or non-fee owner-
ship,2 but each class is further subdivided.24 Therefore, to under-
16. See ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 1 13-4; see also Straw, supra note 13, at
1543 ("[t]he use of the time share was first adopted by developers who needed a
highly leveraged 'bail-out' of their failing projects during the recession of 1976").
Normally, the developer will triple the wholesale price of a unit before it is divided
into the designated number of time segments. Before You Buy, supra note 15, at 46.
Although the developer realized a substantially greater profit on the sale of the unit in
segments, the cost to sell a timeshare unit is approximately 40% to 50% greater than
selling the undivided unit to one purchaser. Pollack, supra note 1, at 287. The author
attributes part of the increase to the difficulty of selling time segments that are not as
desirable. Id at 288.
17. In general, the high cost of condominiums limits their marketability to the
wealthy. Dividing the condominium unit into time segments increases the number of
potential consumers. M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 1-3.
18. Initial reports suggested that timesharing could "result in vacation saving[s] as
much as 60 per cent on hotel and restaurant bills...." "Time Sharing" of Resort
Homes, 82 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 14, 1977, at 49; see also Tips on Time
Sharing, 90 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 16, 1981, at 78. Despite these early
predictions, consumer advocates now caution potential purchasers that inherent risks
may offset savings. Curtis, supra note 15, at 115, 123. See infra notes 182-237 and
accompanying text.
Developers also have sold timesharing to consumers as an investment. Timeshar-
ing may provide a successful investment for the developer, but not for the purchaser,
because it lacks an established resale market and those who do resell must compete
against the developer. Before You Buy, supra note 15, at 46.
19. Developers have implemented "rental pools" to help condominium owners
locate renters. The developers terminated this service when it became subject to se-
curities regulations. M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 1-4; see generally Comment, supra
note 7, at 182.
20. The basic timesharing structures are presented here, not as an analysis of the
structures, but rather as an illustration of the basic devices that courts and legislatures
will confront. For a comprehensive discussion of real estate timesharing formats, see
ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 11I 13-5 to 13-7.
21. For example, tenancy in common timesharing also is known as timesharing
ownership and time span ownership. Cf. Pollack, supra note 1, at 283-84; Comment,
supra note 7, at 184.
22. See infra notes 25-60 and accompanying text.
23. See ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-5.
24. See id. 1I 13-5 to 13-7. See infra notes 25-60 and accompanying text.
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stand timesharing, one must first know its basic classifications.
A. Fee Ownership
Some timesharing structures provide the purchaser with a fee inter-
est in real property.25 Despite the format, the timesharing fee owner
acquires all the incidents of real property ownership.26 Fee owner-
ship of real estate timesharing takes one of three forms: tenancy in
common, interval ownership, and term for years.
Tenancy in common developed as the first form of timesharing fee
ownership.27 Here, the purchaser obtains an undivided interest in fee
as a tenant in common.28 In a separate agreement, the purchasers
designate the specific time during which each purchaser has the ex-
clusive right to use the unit.29 This agreement usually contains a
waiver of the right to partition.3 °
In an effort to avoid some of the legal consequences of tenancy in
common timesharing, interval ownership developed.3" One instru-
ment, the deed, conveys to the unit purchaser both the title and the
periodic exclusive right-to-use.32 Generally, commentators describe
interval ownership as a recurring estate for years for a designated
number of years 33 with a remainder over as tenants in common.
3 4
When the term of years expires, the owners are free to partition the
25. See Gunnar, Regulation of Resort Time-Sharing, 57 OR. L. REV. 31, 33 (1977);
see also Pollack, supra note I, at 286. The author notes these interests may be "sold,
bequeathed, donated, and rented. They are subject to the same burdens: increasing
taxes and operating costs, as well as refurbishing." Pollack, supra note 1, at 286.
26. See, e.g., ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 1 13-5.
27. See generalv Straw, supra note 13, at 1044.
28. ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-6.
29. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 1, at 284.
30. The right to partition tenancy in common property is premised on common
law property rights. This right permits a "co-tenant to petition a court to direct. . . a
co-owned parcel of land be either physically partitioned or divided between the indi-
vidual interest holders into separate fee simple parcels being distributed among the
owners according to their pro rata share." M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3-15. Often
developers incorporate an agreement not to partition in the master deed. Id. § 3-19.
This waiver is not enforceable if courts find the restriction unreasonable. Id.
31. Because the individual purchasers do not own the units as tenants in common,
the threat of partition does not exist.
32. See Davis, The Second Home Market.- Time-Sharing Ownershop-Legal and
Practical Problems, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1183 (1974).
33. This is frequently the useful life of the building.
34. This format also is known as a "revolving set of springing or shifting execu-
1984]
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property or restructure the units in a timesharing program.3" The
owner thus receives a present possessory interest in each year for a
specific time segment and a future interest in that designated time for
the remaining years.
The third version of fee ownership is the interval estate, also
known as term for years.36 Essentially, the interval estate differs little
from interval ownership.37 This third format grants the purchaser a
term for years with a remainder over in fee simple as a tenant in
common.38 Not until the purchasers become tenants in common do
they have an interest in real property. 39
B. Non-Fee Ownership
The consumer does not acquire a fee interest in the real estate with
non-fee ownership.4" Under a non-fee timesharing plan, the fee
owner4' is charged with management, upkeep, taxes, and the other
responsibilities of fee simple ownership. The developer often prefers
to retain the fee in order to accumulate the equity and avoid real
estate regulations.42 Essentially, non-fee ownership grants the pur-
chaser the right of use and occupation.43 These characteristics make
non-fee timesharing susceptible to creativity, flexibility, and fraud.4
tory uses." See M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3-23; see also ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra
note 4, 13-6.
35. The remainder over as tenants in common avoids violation of the rule against
perpetuities. See M. HENZE, supra note 4, §§ 3-23 to 3-25.
36. See id. §§ 3-26 to 3-27. Several commentators do not recognize this format as
a separate type of fee ownership. Cf. RoMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-6.
37. Some commentators suggest that the term for years does not differ from the
term interval ownership but is merely a refinement or a better description of that
term. See, e.g., M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3-26.
38. Id. § 3-27.
39. Id. §§ 3-27 to 3-28.
40. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 1, at 285-86. One commentator suggests that
non-fee ownership is divided into "right-to-use" and "quasi-ownership" categories.
M. HENZE, supra note 4, §§ 2-1 to 2-2.
41. Frequently the developer retains fee ownership.
42. See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Davis, Real Estate Time Sharing in Florida-A Practitioner's View, 55
FLA. B.J. 116, 116-17 (1981). The author explains that the "purchaser enters into a
contractual right for the recurring use periods." Id
44. Cf. id. at 118. Because right-to-use timesharing frequently does not fit neatly
under existing regulatory devices, developers may fail "to disclose to potential pur-
chasers the underlying encumbrances on the property and the financial condition of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/6
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The non-fee format offers a wider variety of options than is available
with the fee format. The basic formats in use include timesharing
leases, timesharing licenses, and membership clubs.
With a timesharing lease, the consumer acquires the right to use
and to occupy a specific unit for a portion of each year for the agreed
upon number of years.4 5 The consumer pays an amount equivalent to
prepaid rent.46 At the end of the specified number of years, the inter-
est reverts to the fee owner.47 Although the purchaser receives an
interest in real estate48 that can be recorded,49 she lacks a proprietary
interest.5" In a timesharing lease, unlike other non-fee ownerships,
the purchaser can transfer or sublease the interest without the fee
owner's consent unless the lease provides otherwise.5
The timesharing license is often indistinguishable from the
timesharing lease.52 The purchaser, with the permission of the fee
owner, receives the right to use an undesignated unit during a portion
of a year for a predetermined number of years. 53 Contract law ap-
plies to timesharing licenses54 because no formal property interest
the developer." Land Investments and Time-Sharing Abuses: Hearings Before the Se-
lect Comm. on Aging of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1983)
(testimony of Garth C. Lucero, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, Colo.) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
45. See M. HENZE, supra note 4, §§ 3-4 to 3-5; see also ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra
note 4, 13-6 to 13-7.
46. See, e.g., Straw, supra note 13, at 1544.
47. See M. HENZE. supra note 4, § 3-5.
48. At early common law leases were considered personal property. Leases, how-
ever, now are classified as chattel real and, as a term of years, are considered an
interest in land. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 64
(1962).
49. The developer may include in the agreement a covenant that bars recording
the interest to preserve his ability to refinance the property. See M. HENZE, supra
note 4, § 3-5.
50. See. e.g., id. § 3-5.
51. This distinguishes a timesharing lease from a license, under which these rights
do not exist unless the fee owner grants permission. Id §§ 3-5 to 3-8.
52. Id. § 3-7 n.2. A recent timesharing case developed a test to determine whether
an agreement creates a license or lease. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 11 13-7. Commentators classify
generally the vacation license as a "contractual right to use." Id
54. See, e.g., ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 1 13-7. In addition, the Internal
Revenue Service issued Letter Ruling 8252005 which stated that the '".vacation
licenses' sold by the taxpayer amounted to contracts for future services, rather than a
conveyance of real property or a lease, and thus all the income from the future serv-
1984)
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arises.55
Unlike timesharing leases and licenses, an organization operates
the timesharing membership club.56 The association purchases,
leases, or licenses units or entire complexes for its members. 7 The
member pays annual or lifetime membership dues plus a mainte-
nance fee for each period of use." In return she receives the right to
use and to occupy a unit for a specific amount of time each year.5 9
Most membership clubs grant the purchaser an ownership interest
but not a real estate interest. 60
Understanding these basic formats provides a basis for determin-
ing the appropriate method of timesharing regulation. As the
timesharing industry becomes more sophisticated, even more
timesharing forms undoubtedly will appear. The manner of regula-
tion adopted, therefore, should encompass all present timesharing
structures and anticipate those that may develop in the future.
III. TIMESHARING REGULATION
A. State and Local Regulation
1. Specific Timesharing Regulation
Commentators have noted the confusion in the timesharing indus-
try stemming from the assortment of regulations that directly or indi-
rectly affect timesharing.6 These perceptions helped induce the
ices contract was reportable in the year of sale." Time-Sharing Vacation License is
Future Services Contract, 58 J. TAX'N 350, 350 (Kaster ed. 1983).
55. See ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-7; cf. Division of Real Estate v.
Carriage House Assocs., 94 Nev. 707, 585 P.2d 1337 (1978) (vacation license gives
contractual rights but no property interest); Davis, supra note 32, at 1184.
56. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 1, at 285-86.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3-10. While a specific amount of time is
guaranteed, particular times may issue on a "first come, first served" basis annually.
Id Nevertheless, the same author suggests that a timeshare membership club may be
structured such that a purchaser obtains a proprietary interest. 1d.
60. But cf id
61. See infra notes 64-112 and accompanying text; Bloch, supra note I, at 24
(state-by-state analysis of timesharing regulations); see also M. HENZE, supra note 4;
ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4; Pollack, supra note 1, at 294-95.
This section provides essential background information for the development of this




gradual movement towards uniform and comprehensive timesharing
legislation.62 In addition, two model timesharing acts now are avail-
able to assist state legislators in drafting timesharing statutes.63
These model acts, the Commissioners' Model Real Estate Time-
Share Act (MRETSA) 6 and the Model Time-Share Ownership Act
(MTSOA),6 5 both provide for timesharing regulation, ownership
guidelines, sales requirements, and consumer protection. 66 Despite
these similarities, MRETSA is a more detailed and consumer-ori-
ented statute.67 At least one state has passed a timesharing statute
incorporating provisions from both model acts.6 8
Because of the recent rapid development of the industry,6 9 the
unique concept, 70 and the inexperience of the growing number of
62. Generally, resort-oriented states have implemented timesharing legislation.
For a discussion of states with timesharing statutes, see ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra
note 4, 13-37; Bloch, supra note 1, at 26-31.
63. See Time-Share Legislation, supra note 4, at 44.
64. See supra note 5. Although the Commissioner's Prefatory Note to this act
recognizes that many reasons for uniform legislation exist, it expressly states:
[Ulniformity is important to the multi-state purchasers and national lenders who
find it difficult to assess the appropriateness of varying real estate documents and
financing arrangements in the several states. Uniformity is particularly impor-
tant with regard to timeshare ownership because most real estate timesharing
involves recreational or resort property, and consequently more multi-state rela-
tionships exist than with other types of real estate.
Id. at 259. For a discussion of this Act, see generally Burek, Uniform Real Estate
Time-Share Act, 14 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 683 (1979).
65. See supra note 5. Both the Resort Time-Sharing Council (RTC) and the Na-
tional Association of Real Estate License Law Officials (NARELLO) sponsored this
Act. The express goal of the Act is "to prescribe reasonable state regulation of time-
sharing in order to avoid or minimize potential abusive or fraudulent sales practices."
M. HENZE, supra note 4, at app. 5-1.
For a comparison of the Model Time-Sharing Ownership Act with the Model Real
Estate Time-Share Act, see Pollack, supra note I, at 294-301.
66, Pollack, supra note 1, at 294-301.
67. Id. One commentator noted that despite meager legislative and administra-
tive experience with timesharing regulations, the Commissioners' Model Real Estate
Time-Share Act provides legislators with an extensive "second generation act."
Burek, supra note 64, at 690. Supporters of the Commissioners' Model Time-Share
Ownership Act contend that the Model Real Estate Time-Share Act is too compre-
hensive for new development. See, e.g., Time-Share Legislation, supra note 4, at 543-
44.
68. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 721.01-.30 (West Supp. 1984); see also Bloch, supra note
1, at 24-31.
69. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 20-60 and accompanying text.
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consumers,71 a state statute that specifically regulates timesharing can
help protect the public and enhance timesharing development. 72 Ab-
sent a state timesharing statute or other applicable legislation, local
legislative bodies may implement zoning laws73 or other ordi-
nances.74 Although local ordinances may satisfy the need for specific
timesharing legislation, they exacerbate the fragmentation of
timesharing regulation.71 In many instances, these ordinances effec-
tively eliminate timesharing from a local area.76
71. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
73. See Rugani, supra note 4, at 8. The local body can assert a legitimate interest
in regulating residential and transient growth. Developers face two primary problems
when the local body implements zoning ordinances that specifically regulate
timesharing. First, the zoning scheme may bar timesharing altogether. Second, some
localities will classify timesharing as a transient use while others classify it as a non-
transient use. This too increases the fragmentation and regulatory confusion for both
consumers and developers. See id
74. ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-37 to 13-38; Rugani, supra note 4, at
8. Other than zoning, local legislators also are concerned about the loss of "bed tax"
revenue, a per-bed tax on transient accommodations. Therefore, localities have
sought to reassess the real estate taxes based on the market value of the individual
timesharing estate. Id
In Board of County Comm'rs v. Colorado Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 628 P.2d 156
(Colo. App. 1981), the "county assessor increased the value of the property 200% to
300%. . .[based on] an independent assessment of each time share unit." 628 P.2d at
157. The court rejected the 1978 reassessment stating that state statutory recognition
in 1977 of real estate timesharing as a property interest did not increase the use of the
property. The court supported its conclusion by pointing out that the 1977 assess-
ments were based on the 1973 value. 628 P.2d at 158.
In some instances local bodies have imposed moratoria on timesharing develop-
ment and sale. ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, q 13-37. A solution to this di-
lemma is proposed in the Commissioners' Model Real Estate Time Share Act. It bars
local governments from implementing regulations that either discriminate against
timesharing or prevent development of timesharing projects. One commentator sug-
gests that this solution is unsatisfactory because "it may eliminate the ability of state
agencies or local governments to zone timeshared buildings." Comment, Regulating
Vacation Timesharing, supra note I, at 938. For a discussion of local governments that
instituted moratoria on timeshare projects, see ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4,
113-37; Rugani, supra note 4, at 8.
75. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
76. See Ocean's Edge Dev. Corp. v. Town of Juno Beach, 430 So. 2d 472 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983). Juno Beach passed an ordinance declaring a moratorium on a
timesharing development one month after the developer filed a declaration of condo-
minium for interval ownership or timesharing and after the developer made expendi-
tures based on the existing ordinances. The court struck down the city's denial of a
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/6
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2. Timesharing Regulation by Existing Mechanisms
The majority of states have not enacted comprehensive timeshar-
ing legislation.77 Instead, these states have turned to existing regula-
tory mechanisms." Problems arise when states attempt to deal with
timesharing in this manner because legislators did not design these
devices with timesharing in mind.79 Consequently, a governing body
may apply these overlapping regulatory schemes inconsistently with
anomalous consequences.80 Nevertheless, these regulatory structures
can provide a framework for controlled timesharing development."1
Many states use existing condominium statutes,82 subdivision con-
trol laws,83 zoning laws, 4 and real estate departments 85 to regulate
certificate of occupancy stating that the town could not enact such a moratorium in an
"after-the-fact fashion." Id. at 474.
One author noted that implementation of the Hawaii timesharing statute averted
the potential elimination of timesharing. ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-37
to 13-38.
77. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 1, at 25, 35-36 (noting the majority of states regu-
late timesharing under existing mechanisms: only Arizona, California, Florida, Ha-
waii, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia have timesharing statutes); accord
Burek, supra note 64, at 683.
78. For an extensive analysis of each state's regulatory formats, see Bloch, supra
note 1, at 35-36. In addition to the common state regulatory devices noted in the text,
some commentators also suggest regulation by usury laws, income taxes, ad valorem
taxes, or direct mail solicitation controls. ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-37;
Davis, supra note 43, at 118-19.
79. See Comment, supra note 7, at 217-20.
80. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 23-24. This problem becomes particularly acute
with non-fee timesharing ownership. This Note focuses on the regulatory fragmenta-
tion problems of non-fee timesharing. See infra text accompanying notes 113-81.
81. See Comment, supra note 7, at 220-22 (commentator notes that application of
existing regulations may create other legal perplexities but suggests that existing laws
will enhance stability).
82. The timesharing concept developed, in part, from condominium theory. Con-
sequently, states naturally turn to these statutes when confronted with the issue of
timesharing. In a minority of states, the condominium statutes contain specific
timesharing provisions. Because legislatures usually neglect to enact condominium
statutes with timesharing in mind, regulatory inconsistencies arise among the states.
Several commentators suggest that because of the inherent differences between the
condominium and timesharing concepts, condominium statutes do not regulate
timesharing adequately. See Pollack, supra note 1, at 295; Comment, Regulating Va-
cation Timesharing, supra note 1, at 934-35; but c. Comment, supra note 7, at 220
(author points out that in a state that does not otherwise regulate timesharing, condo-
minium laws provide some protection).
83. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 25 n. 14 (nine states regulate timesharing with sub-
division control laws). Commentators propose arguments similar to those made in
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timesharing. Basically, these states recognize the similarities between
timesharing and condominium sales or other real estate transfers.8 6
Other states rely on their securities laws87 or "little FTC Acts,"88 both
of which focus on consumer protection. 9 Furthermore, a few states
have not adopted any timesharing regulations." Finally, some states
commonly apply several of these regulatory devices to real estate
regard to regulating timesharing with condominium statutes, that is, that the statutes
fail to provide substantive protection. Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing,
supra note I, at 935.
84. In addition to specific timeshare regulation at the local level, timesharing is
also subject to regulation under existing zoning formats. Anomalous and inconsistent
results may occur because these ordinances were not designed to accommodate
timesharing arrangements. Rugani, supra note 4, at 8. See also County of Maui v.
Puamana Management Corp., 631 P.2d 1215 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981). In Puantana
Management Corp., the court held that a planned unit development of single-family
dwelling units, timeshared in one week periods, did not violate the local zoning ordi-
nance on its face. Although the development was located in a district zoned for resi-
dential use, its operation was similar to a hotel and it served transient guests. The
court concluded that the local legislators, and not the courts, must clarify the zoning
ordinances. Id. at 1219. For a discussion of Puamana Management Corp., see Resi-
dential Zoning Ordinance Held to Permit Time Share Rentals, 4 ZONING & PLAN. L.
REP. 175 (1981).
85. See Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing, supra note 1, at 934-35. The
author suggests that an advantage of real estate regulation of timesharing is the un-
derstanding of land sales and property concepts. Id. The effectiveness of this form of
regulation becomes suspect when a court construes narrowly a real estate depart-
ment's authority over timesharing. See infra text accompanying notes 127-81.
86. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 23-24, 28-29; see also Comment, Regulating Vaca-
tion Timesharing, supra note 1, at 934-35.
87. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 25 n.16 (author examines those states that currently
regulate timesharing under state securities laws). Generally, states apply two different
tests in determining whether a timesharing development is a security: the investment
contract test and the risk capital test. The majority of states use the federal SEC
standard-the investment contract test. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
The risk capital test, the minority test, is triggered if the funds "are used to develop
the project, repay an outstanding encumbrance on the property, or otherwise finance
the project. . . ." Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing, supra note 1, at 928.
88. Bloch, supra note 1, at 25 n.17. The author explains that "little FTC Acts" are
used often in conjunction with other state regulatory devices that regulate timeshar-
ing. The author notes that 29 states have adopted these acts. Id.
89. Gunnar, supra note 25, at 40-42.
90. Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing, supra note 1, at 907. Approxi-
mately 10 states do not regulate timesharing. Bloch, supra note 1, at 25 n.20. One
author suggests that in a state that does not regulate timesharing, a court may find an
implied warranty of habitability. This argument has been applied successfully to con-
dominiums, but there is some doubt whether the implied warranty applies to
timesharing absent some form of ownership. M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 10-20. In
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timesharing, although these laws may not have been intended or
structured to accommodate the timesharing concept.91
B. Federal Regulation
1. Security and Exchange Commission
The debate continues 92 over whether real estate timesharing9 3 is a
"security" as defined in the Securities Act of 1933.9' The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) applies the investment contract
test95 to determine if a security exists. Basically, the SEC will find an
that case, the purchaser can argue under contract law for an implied warranty of
merchantability for a particular purpose.
91. In many instances, application of more than one existing regulatory device
may create a complementary alternative if the state does not have a timeshare statute.
Problems may develop, however, when the different state regulatory agencies have
inconsistent policies. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 1, at 23.
92. Compare Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing, supra note 1, at 911-33
(arguing that timesharing interests fall in the gray area between securities and com-
mercial interests and because securities laws protect the consumer they should apply)
with Bloch, supra note 1, at 32-37 (stating that timesharing does not involve profit
sharing, rental pools, or limited partnerships; but rather is a commodity for personal
consumption that should not be treated as a security).
In United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Supreme Court
considered whether "shares of stock entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment in Co-
op City, a state subsidized and supervised nonprofit housing cooperative, are 'securi-
ties' within the purview of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934." Id. at 840. The Court applied the test derived from S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), to determine if the shares in the co-op constituted a security.
Id. at 852. This test considers "whether the scheme involves an investment of money
in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." Howey,
328 U.S. at 301. Therefore, the Forman Court concluded that the shares in Co-op
City did not constitute securities because purchasers sought personal living quarters
rather than an investment. 421 U.S. at 858. The result may differ when the timeshar-
ing consumer purchases the unit as an investment. Timesharing units, however, gen-
erally are sold in timespans of one to two weeks per year. This short time-span
suggests that timesharing purchasers only desire the unit for their personal consump-
tion rather than as an investment for profit.
93. The fact that some forms of timesharing involve the sale of real estate should
not bar the application of securities laws. Comment, Regulating Vacation Timeshar-
ing, supra note 1, at 930. Contra Gunnar, supra note 25, at 48.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982).
95. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 32-33. This standard uses a version of the Howey
test, supra note 92, to determine whether a particular investment is a security. In
addition to the standard in Howey, the SEC asks whether the investor in the common
venture had a reasonable expectation of profits from efforts of others over which the
investor has little or no control. Id. at 32; cf. Comment, Regulating Vacation
Timesharing, supra note I, at 911-27.
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investment contract when there is a contract "to contribute money to
a common venture based on a reasonable expectation of profits to
come from the efforts of others, over which efforts the investor has
little or no control."96 If an investment contract exists, then the SEC
considers the timesharing development a security.
The developer must comply with rigid registration requirements 97
if the timesharing unit is a security. The purpose of these require-
ments is to deter fraud98 and to provide the public with information
essential for determining the value of the property.99 Although sev-
eral timesharing developments are registered with the SEC," the
Commission has remained silent.' °'
2. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Although the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) has not yet tried to regulate timesharing, 0 2 it may have au-
96. The risk capital test, however, presents the stronger view for regulating
timesharing as securities. One commentator explains that the primary difference be-
tween this theory and the investment contract theory is that under the former scheme
the investor "subjects his funds to the 'risks' of the enterprise." Bloch, supra note I, at
33. In addition, interpretation of "profits" under this theory includes "valuable bene-
fit." Id.
97. Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing, supra note 1, at 930-31.
98. Id.
99. Id
100. See ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, % 13-36. A developer may register to
avoid having to determine whether the development constitutes a security, or she may
seek to market the development as a security. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 37.
101. Although the SEC initially issued no-action letters, it has discontinued this
procedure. Commentators suggest that the SEC currently does not take a position on
the issue. See ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-36.
If the timesharing format includes an investment-oriented program similar to a
rental pool, it probably qualifies as a security. To avoid this result, possible solutions
include inserting a "no resale at profit" clause, using a trust arrangement during the
offering period, and not marketing the development as an investment. Bloch, supra
note I, at 37.
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1982). Although commentators explain that the
HUD agency may have the power to regulate developments in interstate sales, they
note that timesharing developments may be exempted. The scope of authority of the
Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration (OILSR) does not extend to residential
housing contracted to be built and delivered within two years. 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(3)
(1982). OILSR has interpreted this exemption to include resort housing. See Com-
ment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing, supra note 1, at 933 n. 123. The regulations
also may not apply to those developments that do not grant the purchaser an interest
in real property. Id.
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thority to regulate timesharing developments through its Office of In-
terstate Land Sales Registration (OILSR). °3 The current HUD
regulatory power, however, may not include timesharing because of
statutory limitations.1°4 One commentator suggests that OILSR will
become active in regulating timesharing with the expansion of the
practice of preselling timesharing units during the construction
period.' O5
3. Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has monitored timesharing
since its introduction in the United States. 0 6 The Commission de-
rives its authority from the Federal Truth in Lending Act. 107 The
two primary trade regulation rules with which the FTC implements
the Act are the Holder Rule and the Cooling-Off Rule. The holder-
in-due-course rule protects consumers purchasing consumer goods or
services through the terms of the consumer credit contract.'08 Under
the cooling-off rule, a purchaser may rescind the sale within three
days if the unit was not sold at the seller's permanent place of busi-
ness. Up to this point the FTC has not applied the cooling-off rule to
timesharing unit sales.'0 9 Nevertheless, the FTC strives to enjoin un-
fair and deceptive timesharing sales practices.1 0 These areas repre-
sent predominant consumer concerns about timesharing,"' and the
103. Comment, Regulating Vacation Timesharing, supra note 1, at 933.
104. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 46-48.
105. Id.
106. Hearings, supra note 44, at 77 (statement of Timothy J. Mudis, Director, Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection, FTC).
107. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 41-46; see also RoMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4,
13-36.
108. FTC GUIDELINES, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,023 (1976). One commentator contends
that the holder rule for consumer services should not apply to real property, but the
FTC claims that substance should prevail over form. Bloch, supra note 1, at 45. Even
fee timesharing "may have components of goods and services .. " Id. For a dis-
cussion of this issue, see FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No. C81-1160V,
(W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 28, 1981); Bloch, supra note 1, at 42-45.
109. 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1984); see also Bloch, supra note 1, at 45-46.
110. See ROMNEY v. ROMNEY, supra note 4, $ 13-36.
111. Concern for educating consumers reaches beyond the FTC; the mass media
also has attempted to alert the public about the benefits and the problems surround-
ing real estate timesharing. See generally Before You Buy, supra note 15, at 45-46
(warning consumers about deceptive tactics, development bankruptcy, and inade-
quate management); Curtis, supra note 15, at 115-23 (suggesting danger signals poten-
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FTC readily assists consumers with their complaints.' 1 2
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF NON-FEE TIMESHARING OWNERSHIP
A. Examination of Non-Fee Timesharing as a Property Interest
Real estate timesharing as an industry continues to expand both in
scope 1 13 and in size." 4 The original form of timesharing fee owner-
ship'" 5-tenancy in common-has spawned other fee and non-fee
formats to accomplish the goals of both the consumer and the devel-
oper." 16 Even though comprehensive timesharing legislation is avail-
able," 7 the majority of states rely on existing state regulations." 8 The
sheer number of existing regulatory devices creates confusion within
the timesharing industry,' and this confusion is compounded be-
cause none of these regulatory measures apply to all timesharing for-
mats. 20 This situation exists because legislators did not pass statutes
specifically designed to address the timesharing concept. 121
States generally construe timesharing fee ownership as an interest
tial purchasers should look out for); Guaranteed Getaways, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 1979,
at 104 (demonstrating skepticism that timesharing can save purchasers money); Holi-
day Condos, supra note 14, at 54 (warning consumers about high pressure sales).
Although Congress has passed no timesharing legislation, the House of Representa-
tives has held hearings on real estate timesharing and the elderly. One speaker ex-
plained that within a three-year span "the reported complaints concerning time share
businesses have numbered approximately 1,300, totaling over $3.2 million in losses in
Colorado." Hearings, supra note 44, at 39 (statement of Garth C. Lucero, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Denver, Colo.).
112. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 41-46.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 20-60.
114. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
116. Cf. ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-85.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 63-72.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 63-72. A state may not implement a
timesharing statute if timesharing developments are scarce in the state. The states
with specific timesharing legislation generally are the states with popular resort areas.
These include Hawaii, California, and Florida. See Bloch, supra note i, at 35-36.
119. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Regulat-
ing Vacation Timesharing, supra note 1, at 910-11.
120. Id
121. That a particular regulatory device was not designed to accommodate or
foresee real estate timesharing does not mean that its particular goals are inapplica-
ble. Goals such as consumer protection and full disclosure are equally vital when
applied to the sale of timeshare units.
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in real property 122 and, therefore, apply regulations that govern real
estate. Non-fee timesharing and its variations do not fit neatly into
any existing state regulatory framework.' 23 Traditionally, these bod-
ies did not construe such ownership as an interest in real property.' 24
Ideally, states will implement statutes that regulate all forms of real
estate timesharing. Absent such a statute, courts and legislatures
must decide whether non-fee timesharing ownership is subject to reg-
ulatory power of existing state agencies. 25
The traditional view holds that non-fee timesharing ownership,
also called "right-to-use" ownership, does not create an interest in
real property.' 26 This view is illustrated by the decision in Division of
Real Estate v. Carriage House Associates,127 when the court held that
the timeshare purchasers did not acquire a leasehold' 28 interest in
real property but only a vacation license.' 2 9 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the court first examined the circumstances of this particular of-
fering.'"3 The timesharing owner had the right to reserve occupancy
in an undesignated unit every year for the useful life of the build-
122. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
123. Rugani, supra note 4, at 5; see also ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-7
(author states that right-to-use timesharing creates a contractual right).
124. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 25, 35-36.
125. The authority granted to agencies regulating real estate is, in general, statu-
tory. The determination of whether an agency may regulate the right-to-use
timesharing is often a question of statutory construction and not merely common law
real property principles. See Cal-Am Corp. v. Department of Real Estate, 104 Cal.
App. 3d 453, 163 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1980) (see infra notes 157, 159-71 and accompanying
text); Division of Real Estate v. Carriage House Assocs., 94 Nev. 707, 585 P.2d 1337
(1978) (see infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text); Royal Aloha Partners v. Real
Estate Div., 59 Or. App. 564, 651 P.2d 1350 (1982) (see infra notes 137-50 and accom-
panying text).
126. See ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-6 to 13-7.
127. 94 Nev. 707, 585 P.2d 1337 (1978).
128. The court stated that the interest created was not a leasehold "because it is
not definite as to its duration or description. ... "d at 709.
129. id. at 708-09, 585 P.2d at 1338-39. The court defined a vacation license as a
"form of time-sharing which divides the occupancy rights to resort units among mul-
tiple parties." Id. at 708, 585 P.2d at 1338. In addition, the court explained that the
.vacation license" only provides the consumer with a "contractual right," not an in-
terest in real property, nor even a true license because the timeshare is irrevocable and
transferable. Id. at 709, 585 P.2d at 1339.
130. Id. The Carriage House Partners offering granted purchasers the "contrac-
tual nght to reserve for occupancy. . . for an aggregate of seven days each year, a
suite of a designated type and location during a designated season of the year." Id at
708, 585 P.2d at 1338.
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ing.131 This timeshare was irrevocable, and purchasers could not rent
or sublet their interests, but they could transfer their interests by gift,
devise, or approval of the association. 132 In addition, purchasers re-
ceived no deed or title to indicate an interest in real property. 3 ' Fi-
nally, the court noted that the fee owner provided services to the
purchasers similar to those of a hotel.'34 In light of these factors, the
court concluded that neither the real estate laws nor the land subdivi-
sion laws apply to vacation licenses, until the state legislature decides
otherwise. 13
5
The Carriage House court merely reiterates the traditional view
that contract law applies because a vacation license grants no formal
interest in real property. 136 Some courts have gone further in enforc-
ing this view. In Royal Aloha Partners v. Real Estate Division,137 a
state court invalidated a state real estate division's "right-to-use"
timesharing regulations. 138 Royal Aloha Partners (Partners) ac-
quired timesharing units for Royal Aloha Vacation Club members'
use. 139 Only the Partners, not the individual members, 4 ' held title to
131. The license agreement granted an irrevocable right-to-use for "not less than
40 years nor more than 60 years from January 1, 1976." Id. at 709.
132. Id
133. Id
134. Id These services included maid service, towels, linens, kitchenware, man-
agement, and reservation services. Id. The court overlooks the fact that these services
are inherent in timesharing developments, both for fee and non-fee ownership. Often
this occurs because of a transitory nature of timesharing and the relatively short pe-
riod of time during which each owner has use of the unit. These duties, therefore,
generally are delegated to a management group.
135. Id. Because the Nevada Attorney General issued opinions that existing reg-
ulations sufficiently encompass right-to-use timesharing, the state now regulates both
fee and non-fee forms under its land sale laws. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 29, 35.
136. The court struggled with determining how to classify right-to-use timeshar-
ing. Although the Carriage House court noted that this "vacation license" did not
have the traditional characteristics of a license because it was irrevocable and trans-
ferable, the court also felt that the right-to-use plan conveyed no interest in real prop-
erty. Thus, only contract law applies. See Carriage House, 94 Nev. at 708-09, 585
P.2d at 1338-39.
A license in real property is defined as "a privilege to go on premises for a certain
purpose, but does not operate to confer, or vest in, licensee any title, interest, or estate
in such property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (5th ed. 1979).
137. 59 Or. App. 564, 651 P.2d 1350 (1982).
138. Id at 570, 651 P.2d at 1353.
139. Id at 564, 651 P.2d at 1350.




The state agency argued the state Condominium Act 42 gave it au-
thority to regulate 43 all forms of timesharing. Although the Condo-
minium Act expressly encompassed fee timesharing ownership,'" it
did not mention non-fee formats.1 45 The division claimed that be-
cause the legislature mentioned timesharing in the Act, it intended to
regulate all forms of timesharing.' 46 In addition, the legislative his-
tory suggested an intent to govern even non-fee timesharing. 47 The
fore the arrangement did not convey timesharing ownership interest. Id. at 564, 651
P.2d at 1350.
141. Id.
142. OR. REV. STAT. § 94.004(23) (1982) (superseded 1983). The pertinent por-
tion of the Condominium Act provided:
"Interest or estate" also includes a time-share estate. A "time-share estate"
means a combination of an undivided interest in a present estate in fee simple in
a unit, the magnitude of the interest having been established not later than the
creation of the time-share estate either by the project instrument or by the deed
conveying the time-share estate, and an exclusive right to possession and occu-
pancy of the unit during an annually recurring period of time established by a
recorded schedule set forth or referred to in the deed conveying the time-share
estate.
Id. Subsequent to the court's decision in Royal Aloha Partners, the Oregon Legisla-
ture redefined timesharing statutory provisions to include specifically non-fee owner-
ship. Now, the pertinent provision provides:
"'Timeshare plan" means an arrangement, whether by membership, agreement,
tenancy in common, sale, lease, deed, rental agreement, license, right to use
agreement or otherwise, in which an owner receives a timeshare estate or a
timeshare license and the right to use accommodations and facilities that are part
of the timeshare property. A timeshare plan does not include an exchange
program.
OR. REV. STAT. § 94.803(24) (1984).
143. The Real Estate Division promulgated regulations to govern timesharing
plans defined as:
[A]ny arrangement, plan, scheme or devise, excluding exchange programs,
whether by membership, agreement, share, tenancy in common, sale, lease, deed,
rental agreement, license, right to use agreement or otherwise, whereby a pur-
chaser in exchange for consideration, receives a right to use accommodations and
facilities for a period of time less than a full year during any given year, but not
necessarily for consecutive years and which extends for a period of more than 3
years.
RoyalAloha Partners, 59 Or. App. at 565, 651 P.2d at 1351 (emphasis in original)
(construing OR. ADMIN. R. 863-30-050(15) (1982)).
144. Id. at 566, 651 P.2d at 1352.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. The Real Estate Division referred to the testimony of the Oregon House Ju-
diciary Committee to support its argument that the legislature intended the Act to
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court applied the statutory rule of construction that "the expression
of one thing is the exclusion of another,"' 48 and rejected the agency's
arguments. 149 In regard to the legislative history, the court found a
"clear implication" in the Condominium Act that only those "inter-
ests or estates" expressly mentioned in the statute are within its
purview.'5 °
Not all courts feel constrained to classify right-to-use timesharing
interests outside the area of real property.'"' Although statutory con-
struction remains an important element in this determination, 5 2 pol-
icy factors also play a vital role in a court's conclusion that right-to-
use timesharing transfers a real property interest. Arguably, this view
strains common law real property concepts.' 53 Although real estate
timesharing is not a product of traditional common law concepts, 
154
at least one commentator suggests right-to-use timesharing is a real
estate product and should be regulated accordingly)"
apply to both fee and non-fee timesharing. Testimony revealed that the legislators
"'very carefully included within the dragnet time shares, where you're offered an in-
terval, two weeks a year use of a condominium. That even though it may not be a
conveyance of afee estate in a unit, may or may not be, that has to be registered."'
RoyalAloha Partners, 59 Or. App. at 567, 651 P.2d at 1352 (emphasis added by court)
(quoting NEVADA HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., SUBCOMM. C, TAPE 30, SIDE 1, at 405-
10 (testimony of Howard Feuerstein)). But cf. OR. REV. STAT. § 94.803(1984) (en-
acted after Royal Aloha Partners).
148. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979) (defined under its Latin form
expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
149. In response to the Division's arguments the court replied that the "[ilnclusion
of specific matter in a statute usually implies a legislative intent to exclude related
matters not mentioned." RoyalAloha Partners, 59 Or. App. at 567, 651 P.2d at 1352.
150. Id. The court concluded nothing in the legislative history suggested that the
Condominium Act included interests beyond those mentioned expressly. Id. But see
OR. REV. STAT. § 94.803 (1984) (the Oregon Legislature enacted timesharing provi-
sions to encompass non-fee ownership subsequent to Royal Aloha Partners).
At present, Oregon regulates both fee and non-fee timesharing developments under
its real estate statutes. See Bloch, supra note 1, at 36.
151. See, e.g., Cal-Am Corp. v. Department of Real Estate, 104 Cal. App. 3d 453,
456, 163 Cal. Rptr. 729, 732 (1980) (court concluded without discussion that time-
share membership interests constitute real property interests).
152. See supra notes 128-51 and accompanying text.
153. See Carriage House, 94 Nev. at 708-10, 585 P.2d at 1338-40.
154. For a discussion of the traditional real property concepts, see generally C.
MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1962).
155. The president of California Resorts Company, a timesharing development
and management firm, and Chairman of the National Timesharing Council asserted
that timesharing is "a real estate product, even though [it is] not specifically a lease-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/6
REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING
Through the legislative process some states have made right-to-use
timesharing an interest in real property.156  The majority of states
have not taken this step, even though sixty percent of timesharing
developments employ a right-to-use format.'5 7 The courts continue
to disagree.
One California court held that a particular vacation membership
club did constitute an interest in real property.'58 In Cal-Am Corp. v.
Department of Real Estate,"9 the court rejected Cal-Am's statutory
construction argument that the right-to-use timesharing offering fell
outside the Department's authority because the membership interests
did not constitute a sale or lease of lots or parcels in a subdivision to
which the legislature directed the statute. 6 ' In finding an interest in
real property,' 61 the court explained that the interest at issue 162 was
substantively a lease.'63 The court, nevertheless, expressly rejected
the opportunity to classify the real property interest created.' 64 In
addition, the court instituted a test based on exclusive possession to
determine if a right to use interest is a license or a lease.' 65
hold interest." Bankruptcy Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the
Comm. on the Senate Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 405 (1983) (testimony of Carl
Berry, Chairman, National Timesharing Council of the American Land Development
Association) [hereinafter cited as Bankruptcr, Reform Hearings].
156. New Hampshire statutes provide that all timesharing interests are subject to
regulation as real property. See NH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356-B:3XXVIII (Supp.
1981).
157. Burek, supra note 64, at 683.
158. See infra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
159. 104 Cal. App. 3d 453, 163 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1980).
160. Id. at 455, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 731. The pertinent statutory provision defines
subdivision as an "improved or unimproved land or lands divided or proposed to be
divided for the purpose of sale or lease, whether immediate or future, into five or
more lots of parcels." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10249.1 (Deering 1976).
The Cal-Am court noted that other interests, such as "any accompanying member-
ships or other rights or privileges created," also are subject to the subdivision laws.
Id. at 457, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32.
161. Id at 457, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
162. Cal-Am Corporation sells memberships in the Royal Hawaiian Adventure
Club. Members are "entitled" to the use of a one-bedroom condominium unit for one
week each year until December 31, 2041. Id. at 456, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 731 (emphasis
added).
163. Id. at 457, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
164. Id.
165. The Cal-Am court stated:
The test for determining whether an agreement for the use of real property is a
license or a lease is whether the contract gives exclusive possession of the prem-
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Despite many similarities, 6 6 the Cal-Am court did not find Car-
riage House persuasive.'67 The court distinguished Carriage House
noting that here the right-to-use interest terminated on a set date,
December 31, 2041, while the interest in Carriage House continued
for the indeterminate useful life of the building. 68 This distinguish-
ing factor weighed in favor of a determination of exclusive posses-
sion. 169 From this, the Cal-Am court concluded the Department had
the power to issue an order to desist from selling, leasing, or offering
membership interests in the Royal Hawaiian Adventure Club. 170
The Cal-Am court chose substance over strict statutory construc-
tion in order to find an interest in real property.' 7 ' Commentators
suggest several reasons why courts should consider right to use
timesharing as an interest in real property for regulatory purposes.
172
A regulatory loophole results when a right-to-use interest cannot be
regulated as real property. The fee interest is then regulated while
the non-fee interest goes unregulated.' 73 For this reason, many de-
ises against all the world, including the owner, in which case it is a lease, or
whether it merely confers a privilege to occupy under the owner, in which case it
is a license.
Id. See Von Goelitz v. Turner, 65 Cal. App. 2d 425, 150 P.2d 278 (1944).
166. These similarities include units only available after reservation on a first
come, first serve basis. The members in both cases could transfer, devise, or lend their
interest. The respective corporations provided maintenance and maid service. In
addition, the agreements guaranteed the members occupancy if they complied with
reservation requirements. Id at 456-57, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32.
167. Id. at 457, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732. The Cal-Am court characterized Carriage
House as holding "that a membership interest in a resort condominium constitutes
neither a license nor a lease." 1d
168. The Ca/-Am court stressed the difference between an interest terminating on
a fixed date and one the termination date of which is based on an estimated number
of years. This was an important factor in the Cal-Am court's exclusive use test. Id
169. Id. In addition, the Cal-Am court emphasized that it did not matter whether
the management association assigned members to a particular unit and a particular
week on a yearly basis. The property right was defined and specific. Id.
170. Id at 456-60, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 731-33. The Real Estate Department issued
the order after an investigation of a compliant about the Royal Hawaiian Adventure
Club. Id. at 455, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
171. Id. at 457, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 732. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying
text.
172. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 44, at 39-42 (statement of Garth C. Lucero,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, Colo.).
173. In a congressional hearing on timesharing abuses, one witness testified that
the "potential for abuse in the sale of vacation license agreements is very much higher
because the sellers are not required to be licensed with regulatory agencies and the
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velopers purposely choose to structure their development in a right-
to-use format to avoid regulation and licensing.' 7 4 Consumers, how-
ever, purchase right-to-use and fee ownership timesharing for the
same purpose. 7 5 Indeed, the type of timeshare arrangement does not
significantly affect the purchase price of the units.'7 6 As a new and
complex property concept, timesharing may compound the confusion
of a potential purchaser.' 77 Because a salesperson need not have a
license to sell timesharing interests, a purchaser has no guarantee that
the salesperson even will understand what is actually being sold. In
light of these policy factors, commentators suggest broad construction
of real estate regulatory provisions."'
Traditional common law real property principles weigh in favor of
finding that right-to-use timesharing involves no property interest
transfer.'79 Policy factors and broad statutory construction suggest
right-to-use timesharing should be subject to real property regula-
tions. State legislatures can alleviate this regulatory tension if they
institute specific timesharing regulations that encompass all timeshar-ing forms.' 8 '
legal protections typically associated with real estate ownership, such as recording,
foreclosure, and other statutory procedures, do not apply." ld. at 39.
174. One author suggests that the primary reason that developers utilize a vaca-
tion license format is "to avoid state real estate regulations which require the use of
licensed sales people and registration of the offering with the state's Real Estate Com-
mission." M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 3-6.
175. Consumers purchase a timesharing unit so that they can affordably "own"
their own vacation unit. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
Relatively few consumers understand the intricacies of real estate law. They must
rely on the advice of a salesperson. Also, because the timesharing offering is rela-
tively inexpensive, it is likely that an attorney's review of the offering agreement may
increase substantially the cost to the consumer. See generally Straw, supra note 13, at
1543.
176. See Davis, Time-Sharing Ownershi: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 5 REAL EST.
REV. 49, 53 (1976).
177. In addition to conceptual complexities, developers frequently fail to disclose
"underlying encumbrances on the property and the financial condition of the devel-
oper." Hearings, supra note 44, at 42 (testimony of Garth C. Lucero, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Denver, Colo.).
178. See supra notes 61-112 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 127-50 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
181. Although this solves many problems, federal preemption can negate the pro-
tections that states provide timesharing purchasers. See infra notes 212-37 and ac-
companying text.
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B. Complications Common to Fee and Non-Fee Timesharing
Despite non-fee timesharing's constructional perplexities, common
characteristics and problems relate to both fee and non-fee timeshar-
ing. In many respects, either of these formats satisfies the individual
consumer's desire to own a vacation residence. 82 This section briefly
focuses on real estate timesharing complications that apply to both
formats.
Commentators' and courts' initial examinations of timesharing fo-
cused on complications that may arise under the only format then
available-fee ownership.' 83 The primary concerns involve parti-
tion, potential tort liability, and tax lien consequences. Partition is a
right to division or sale of the property inherent in tenancy in com-
mon.'8 4 As such, it does not apply to other fee formats nor does it
usually concern non-fee arrangements. 8 5 The threat of partition has
diminished because of the shift to other fee and non-fee timesharing
formats, and because of contractual waivers of the right. 86
Tort liability especially concerns fee owners of a timesharing de-
velopment. 87 In light of condominium laws,"' courts may appor-
tion liability among the units and not apply joint and several
182. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. Often, the particular
timesharing format results as a matter of developer preference.
183. These complications induced the development of other timesharing struc-
tures, in particular, right-to-use formats.
184. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive discussion,
see M. HENZE, supra note 4, §§ 3-15 to 3-22. This common law right allows a co-
tenant to partition the land, either from proceeds of a forced sale or from physical
division. A single timesharing owner may petition a court for partition and thus de-
stroy the timesharing structure. Id
185. While other timesharing formats can provide for tenancy in common, devel-
opers may avoid such an arrangement to circumvent the partition problem. Id. § 3-15
n.13.
186. Although the timeshare contract may contain a waiver of the right to parti-
tion, a clause disallowing partition generally is considered unreasonable and unen-
forceable. Comment, Legal Challenges, supra note 1, at 433. Nevertheless, a
consumer may not wish to expend the time, effort, and expense to challenge the provi-
sion in court.
187. For a discussion of tort liability in a timesharing development, see Comment,
Legal Challenges, supra note 1, at 436-39. The author examines tort liability arising
from negligence in the common areas, injury to a third party on the property, and
negligent acts by an individual timesharing owner. Id.
188. One commentator suggests that timesharing ownership and condominium
ownership are analogous with respect to common area tort liability. He suggests that
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liability.'89 How the developer structures the timesharing project
may determine how courts apportion liability. Possibilities include
holding all unit owners jointly and severally liable, apportioning lia-
bility among the units while holding the individual unit owners
jointly and severally liable, or further subdividing liability to each
timesharing owner.19
The consequences of a tax lien' 9 1 present complications similar to
those encountered with tort liability. Here again the question be-
comes whether the tax deficiency on a unit encumbers the whole pro-
ject, that individual unit, or just the guilty owner's individual
interest.' 92 Because the fee owner usually can record her individual
timesharing interest, timesharing owners can apportion the defi-
ciency. 193 Under most non-fee structures, the fee owner pays the
taxes 9 4 and the entire project may be subject to a tax lien and sale.
courts apply the same reasons in rejecting joint and several liability and prorating
contmbution among the units. Id. at 437.
If courts will take this theory one step further, liability will be apportioned not
merely by the unit, but by the particular timesharing period of ownership. This liabil-
ity apportionment may become complicated because the value of the timesharing in-
terest will depend on whether it falls within the prime season or not. Cf. Straw, supra
note 13, at 1546-47 (author explains the "calculation of the 'general common element'
share" may be based on the amount of time owned and if it is a peak or low season
use).
189. See id; see also Dutcher v. Owens, 647 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. 1983) (holding
that condominium tort liability is premised not on joint and several liability, but
rather on each co-owner's "'pro rata interest in the regime as a whole. . where such
liability arises from those areas held in tenancy-in-common").
190. See generally Comment, Legal Challenges, supra note 1, at 436-39 (analysis
and presentation of solutions for timesharing tort liability).
191. Often, these consequences depend on the particular form of timesharing
ownership involved. See generally M. HENZE, supra note 4, §§ 7-13 to 7-14 (discus-
sion of real estate tax liens).
192. A recent Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling suggests that the Service will
levy the tax lien only against the deficient owner and not on the entire unit or devel-
opment. Rev. Rul. 79-55, 1979-I C.B. For a discussion of the implications of this
ruling, see M. HENZE, supra note 4, §§ 7-13 to 7-14.
193. id See also Comment, Legal Challenges, supra note 1, at 428-31 (author
notes that such suits are rare and that a pragmatic analysis suggests liability of the
single owner and not joint liability).
194. There are other tax consequences of timesharing besides a tax lien for both
the timesharing consumer and developer. Generally, the developer is concerned with
income tax and property tax consequences of timesharing. The purchase price gener-
ally constitutes ordinary income rather than capital gains. It is possible, however, to
structure the development differently. Non-fee timesharing is the sale of a service and
not the sale of a capital asset and thus no gain from the sale of a property interest
1984)
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When real estate timesharing developed, the focus on timesharing
complications shifted to solicitation, project development, and con-
version.' 95 High pressure sales techniques in the timesharing indus-
try has become a primary concern of consumers and consumer
advocates. 196 These sales techniques persist partly because many
states do not require licensing of non-fee timesharing salespeople.' 
97
Sophisticated marketing techniques also help lure consumers to the
developments with prizes and gifts.' 98 Once there, they become cap-
tive audiences for a high pressure sales pitch.
results. With fee ownership the developer does not retain an interest and, therefore,
cannot depreciate the unit. M. HENZE, supra note 4, §§ 7-2 to 7-4.
The developer also may structure the format to affect the timing of gain recogni-
tion. Under a fee timesharing scheme at least one commentator believes the IRS
probably will recognize the gain as the purchase price is paid. Id §§ 7-4 to 7-5. If a
lump sum payment is required, there will be immediate recognition of the gain. On
the other hand, if the purchaser pays in installments the gain should be recognized
with each payment. The IRS probably will treat non-fee timesharing as prepaid rent.
Id.
A timesharing consumer may deduct interest payments and real estate taxes from
her taxable income. If the timesharing owner rents her interest she may qualify for
further deductions. When the owner does not rent the timeshare interest, the IRS
construes it as a second home. If, however, the owner does rent the interest, she may
deduct depreciation, maintenance expenses, advertising, and losses from attempting
to rent the unit. If the owner uses the interest and rents a portion of the interest, the
IRS may construe it as "part rental." Usually, the IRS construes timesharing interests
as a second home because the owner often owns seven to 10 days, a period insufficient
to meet the minimum yearly rental requirements prescribed in I.R.C. § 280A. Id
§§ 7-16 to 7-14.
Timesharing consumers desiring to sell their non-fee interest must know how the
transfer is taxed. In an IRS letter ruling, the Service stated that a "vacation license"
in a condominium amounts to a contract for future services. Therefore, the seller
must report the sale of this contract in the year of sale. In addition, the ruling stated
that these contracts were neither a lease nor real property. Kaster, supra note 54, at
350.
195. These issues are raised in the pending case FTC v. Paradise Palms Vacation
Club, No. C81-1 160V (W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 28, 1981). For a discussion of this case,
see Bloch, supra note 1, at 24-46.
196. These activities were examined recently in a congressional hearing concern-
ing timesharing abuses. The hearing originally focused on the effect of high pressure
sales tactics on senior citizens. The emphasis of the hearing shifted, however, to the
abuses of timesharing sales in general. Hearings, supra note 44, at 1-4, 39-42, 77-96.
197. Hearings, supra note 44, at 39 (statement of Garth C. Lucero, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Denver, Colo.). Mr. Lucero stated that "the potential for abuse in the sale of
vacation license agreements is . . . much higher because the sellers are not required
to be licensed with regulatory agencies. . . ." Id.
198. See generally Curtis, supra note 15, at 114-23; T4s on Time Sharing, supra
note 18, at 78.
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As previously noted, inconsistent application of zoning regulations
may hamper the orderly development of timesharing in appropriate
areas. "'9 Whether a condominium or a house may be converted into
a timesharing format depends on these same zoning requirements
and perhaps on the condominium bylaws.2"
Another primary concern in timesharing development is the possi-
bility of encumbrances on the entire project.2 ' 1 Methods that provide
consumers with some protection include disclosure and non-distur-
bance clauses in the timesharing contract.20 2
Future complications will develop as real estate timesharing pro-
gresses. A possible trouble spot is long-range management and oper-
ation of the project. 20 3  The transitory nature of timesharing
ownership and increased usage of the units may cause maintenance
complications and more expenses than purchasers anticipated.2" A
non-fee owner is more dependent on the fee owner's ability to assure
proper project maintenance.20 5 In addition, the timesharing owner
relies on the management association to schedule timesharing uses
199. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
200. In Laguana Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d 673, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 136 (1981), the court upheld a condominium unit owner's sale of the unit in
timesharing periods. Although the dissent recognized this transfer as a timesharing
device, the majority did not. See id. For a discussion of this case, see August, Clock-
work Condo: The Time-Sharing Condominium Stumbles into Court, 37 PERs. FIN. L.Q.
REP. 15, 37 (1983).
201. See Eastman, supra note 7, at 161 (generally the mortgage must be paid in
full before partial releases are granted to the individual owner).
202. But cf. Sombrero Reef Club, Inc. v. Allman, 18 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 612
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (federal bankruptcy court held that federal law preempts the
".non-disturbance" clause).
203. Frequently, with fee timesharing the developer manages the complex until
she sells a certain amount of units. At that point, maintenance responsibilities turn
over to the new owners. Curtis, supra note 15, at 123. In many instances, the owners
hire the developer's management subsidiary to continue managing the development.
Id.
Commentators suggest several areas that may pose future problems for timesharing
consumers, such as heavier use because of the greater number of purchasers, difficulty
in making decisions because a majority of owners are never at the development at one
time, increased likelihood of owner defaults or delinquencies in paying assessments,
and the potential for significantly greater unit resale. See ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra
note 4, 13-34.
204. See ROMNEY & RoMNEY, supra note 4, 13-34; see also Pollack, supra note
1. at 288-89. One author suggests that the management group needs greater authority
to operate effectively the timesharing project. Id.
205. Id.
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fairly and accurately.2" 6 The fee owner possesses greater authority
over the management and maintenance of the project.2" 7 This con-
trol is limited because most timesharing projects have many owners
scattered over a wide geographic area, only a few of whom are pres-
ent at the development at any given time.208 This hinders manage-
ment action unless the owners delegate this responsibility. Other
problems directly concern both the fee and non-fee timesharing con-
sumer. These include prior occupant overstay and damage to the
unit by other owners. Association agreements or management con-
trols often provide solutions to such owner problems.2 °9
206. Under a floating system, where the purchaser does not acquire a particular
unit for a particular period each year, the purchaser acquires the option to reserve a
unit for a requested period. Prior to use, the purchaser reserves a timesharing period
and unit on a first-come, first-serve basis. Often, the agreement requires notice of
more than 30 days and less than one year for unit reservations. See generally Rugani,
supra note 4, at 5-6.
One commentator suggests the timesharing development declaration should "con-
tain provisions bordering on the punitive. . . in the event a time share owner holds
over into another owner's period of occupancy." Straw, supra note 13, at 1547.
In addition to vacation scheduling, some commentators suggest that the timeshar-
ing plan include maid service, an information booth, and weekly social gatherings.
See ROMNEY & ROMNEY, supra note 4, 13-35.
207. In a fee timesharing structure, the owners are in charge of management. See
generally Straw, supra note 13, at 1546-47.
208. Generally, there will never be a majority of the owners at the project because
the units are subdivided. Although proxy voting provides one solution, it creates a
fragmented owners association. It is likely, therefore, that there will be greater delays
in resolving management questions.
Various voting patterns include allocating different weights to each owner's votes
based on the amount of time purchased and the cost of the timesharing period or
giving each owner only one vote. One commentator suggests, regardless of the partic-
ular voting method, the owners should elect representatives. The representatives
would choose a board of managers to operate the timesharing project. See Straw,
supra note 13, at 1546-47.
209. Many problems are avoidable if expressly addressed in the various timeshar-
ing documents. Generally, these documents include: The declaration of covenants,
conditions, and restrictions; the articles of incorporation and the bylaws of the
timesharing owners' association; the rules and regulations; the grant deed; the
purchase agreement; and the escrow instructions. Rugani, supra note 4, at 5.
The declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions-or a similar docu-
ment-should allocate individual expences directly to the particular owner. These
expenses include intentional damage and long distance telephone calls. See Straw,
supra note 13, at 1546. In addition, these documents also should prescribe timeshar-




C. Complications Unique to Non-Fee Timesharing Ownership
As previously noted, a state's classification of non-fee timesharing
can produce either harmonious application or anomalous inconsis-
tencies.21° In addition, the inability to classify neatly the non-fee
timesharing concept creates unwelcome consequences beyond the
question of regulatory inconsistencies.2 ' A recent bankruptcy case
confirms this premise.
In Sombrero Reef Club v. Allman,z" z a resort-marina in the process
of converting to a timesharing program declared bankruptcy. At the
time of bankruptcy, there were approximately two hundred timeshar-
ing agreements.2 3  The timesharing agreements, ranging in price
from $1,000 to $3,000, granted a purchaser the "privilege to use" a
unit for one week per year.2" 4 In addition, the developer assessed the
purchasers, whether they paid the contract price in full or under an
installment plan, annual dues to maintain the premises.215 A pur-
chaser reserved a unit on a first-come, first-served basis at least sixty
days in advance of when she wanted to come to the resort.2z 6
Although the developer made unsuccessful attempts to sell the de-
210. See supra notes 113-81 and accompanying text.
211. Inconsistent regulation is only one problem stemming from the failure to
classify timesharing concisely and precisely. Unwelcome consequences develop be-
cause timesharing formats fluctuate between fee and non-fee ownership. Primarily,
two underlying difficulties surface in attempting to classify timesharing. First, courts
treat differently the same or similar forms of timesharing. One court may hold that
right-to-use is an interest in real property and another may conclude that it is not such
an interest. See supra note 122-70 and accompanying text. Second, consumers gener-
ally purchase fee and non-fee timesharing for the same purpose (personal recreation
rather than investment). Relying on common law real property concepts, however,
some courts and commentators refuse to treat the two types of timesharing consist-
ently, which frequently means the non-fee owners' rights remain unprotected while
the fee owners' rights are protected. See supra notes 221-41 and accompanying text.
This inspires developers to structure timesharing developments toward non-fee ar-
rangements to escape any regulations or consumer protections. See supra notes 174-
81 and accompanying text.
212. 18 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 612 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
213. Id. at 612-13.
214. The agreement granted the purchaser a "privilege to use" an accomodation,
not, however, a specific unit or a designated time, for a period of 30 years. The pur-
chasers could not rent, sublease, or sublicense their interests. Sombrero Reef Club, 18
BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) at 614-15, 617-18.
215. Id. at 615-16.
216. Id. at 614.
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velopment with the timesharing agreements,21 7 the bankruptcy court
held that the non-fee timesharing contracts between the bankrupt de-
veloper and his purchasers were executory and, therefore, the debtor
in possession could reject the contracts in order to sell the prop-
erty.218 The court premised this conclusion on section 365,219 the ex-
ecutory contract provision of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.22° In
addition, the court noted that these timesharing contracts neither fall
within the exemptions for unexpired leases, 22' nor within the exemp-
tions for the sale of real property.222
Neither the court nor the parties agreed on the type of timesharing
interest created.223 The court did note, however, that the drafters did
217. Id at 615. Sombrero Reef first attempted to sell the units subject to the
timesharing contracts, but attracted no purchasers. Id
218. Id at 615, 618. One commentator explains that this is an application of the
"business judgment rule" in which the court allows rejection because a reasonable
business person could conclude that the contracts are too burdensome. M. HENZE,
supra note 4, §§ 5A-4 to 5A-5.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982). This section provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Except as provided ... the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume
or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Id § 365(a).
220. Sombrero Reef Club, 18 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) at 615.
221. Id. at 618. The unexpired lease exception provides that:
If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the debtor under
which the debtor is the lessor, the lessee under such lease may treat the lease as
terminated by such rejection, or, in the alternative, may remain in possession for
the balance of the term of such lease and any renewal or extension of such term
that is enforceable by such lessee under applicable non-bankruptcy law.
I 1 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1) (1982).
222. Sombrero Reef Club, 18 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) at 618. The sale of real
property exception provides that: "If the trustee rejects an executory contract of the
debtor for the sale of real property under which the purchaser is in possession, such
purchaser may treat such contract as terminated, or, in the alternative, may remain in
possession of such real property." 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(1) (1982).
Based on the membership agreement, the court stated that Sombrero Reef Club
was not willing to sell a conventional real property interest. Sombrero Reef Club, 18
BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) at 617.
223. Id at 615. The agreement granted the purchaser a privilege to use an accom-
modation for 30 years, but did not designate a specific time or unit. To use a unit, the
purchaser made reservations with the Sombrero Reef Club. They could not rent, sub-
lease, or sub-license their interests. In addition, Sombrero Reef Club assumed re-
sponsibilities for all management and upkeep. Sombrero Reef Club, 18 BANKR. L.
REP. (CCH) at 614-15, 617-18.
Although these facts parallel those of other cases where courts have attempted to
decide what type of interest a non-fee timesharing purchaser acquires, the court did
not examine those cases. See supra notes 127-70 and accompanying text.
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not choose a definite or conventional form of real property."'
Although the purchasers had paid a portion of the price and some
even paid in full, the court found determinative the fact that each
party owed some performance. 2 5 It rejected the contention that the
"non-disturbance" clause2 26 protects these consumers, and concluded
that the Federal Bankruptcy Code preempts this statutory protec-
tion. 2 ' Finally, the court concluded that the purchasers received no
interest in real property, therefore, the contracts fell outside the statu-
tory exemptions of the Bankruptcy Code.228
The implications of the Sombrero Reef Club holding threatened the
timesharing industry,229 the timesharing consumer,2 3 ° and financial
institutions.23 ' This decision limited the viability of non-fee
224. Id. at 617. The court relied on the drafters intent and the statutory language.
The court failed to consider the consumers' intent or policy factors.
225. Id at 615-16. Even though some consumers had paid the full purchase price,
the court held that substantial obligations remained outstanding. The purchasers
must pay yearly maintenance fees and the Sombrero Reef Club must maintain the
project and make units available for the purchasers' use. The court concluded that
the yearly fee was "not a de minimus obligation." Id. at 616.
226. The recorded nondisturbance clause informed purchasers that the property
was encumbered but that the purchasers' rights were protected in accordance with
Florida statutory provisions. Id at 619.
227. Id. at 619-20.
228. Id. at 618.
229. For a general discussion of the consequences of Sombrero Reef Club, see M.
HENZE, supra note 4, §§ 5A-7 to 5A-12; Dungan, Right-to-Use Timeshare Contracts
Rejected in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 12 PROB. & PROP. 3, 4 (1983).
230. The decision was especially detrimental to state timesharing consumer pro-
tection because they would become irrelevant when a timesharing developer declares
bankruptcy. See M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 5A-7. This leaves non-fee timesharing
owners in a precarious position. They purchased what they believed was a state-
protected interest. Now, they realize that this protection is subject to federal preemp-
tion, and they are unable to sell their interest because it cannot be protected. The
purchaser only can hope, therefore, that the development does not go bankrupt.
231. One commentator explains that no financial institution will finance a devel-
oper or accept the paper from installment sales as collateral under the Sombrero Reef
Club rule. Dungan, supra note 229, at 4; see also Bankruptcy Reform Hearings, supra
note 156, at 405 (testimony of Carl Berry, Chairman, National Timesharing Council
of the American Land Development Ass'n) (stating that financiers are "hesitant" to
grant loans or purchase receivables because the timesharing interest may be cut
short).
Of course, financiers who made loans before Sombrero Reef Club may find them-
selves at risk absent protection within the loan agreement. If contractual protection
does exist, banks are more likely to call in the loan because of the increased risk,
emasculating the problems of timesharing developers and consumers.
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timesharing,232 and extended the non-fee timesharing constructional
dilemma.233 The court effectively eliminated the statutory consumer
protections of state timesharing laws.234 The consumers become un-
secured creditors and lending institutions lose their investments.235
Sombrero Reef Club, however, did not threaten fee timesharing
growth,236 and it encouraged creative structuring of new timesharing
formats.237
In response to Sombrero Reef Club, Congress specifically exempted
real estate timesharing from section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code of
1978.238 It did so for the purpose of granting all timesharing pur-
chasers equal treatment with regard to the exemptions from
unexpired leases and the sale of real property.239 Even though the
232. In addition to inconsistent regulatory practices, lenders and purchasers faced
the complete loss of their interest. Commentators suggest this may deter the use of
non-fee timesharing formats. See, e.g., M. HENZE, supra note 4, §§ 5A-7 to SA-8;
Dungan, supra note 229, at 4.
233. See supra note 122-81 and accompanying text.
234. Sombrero Reef Club, 18 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) at 619-20. The Florida Ad-
ministrative Code provisions recognized the need to protect all timesharing purchas-
ers, not merely those with a fee interest. FLA. ADMIN. CODE 2-23-09, superseded by
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.08(3)(b) (West. Supp. 1984). The bankruptcy court could
have extended this logic because the decision to reject executory contracts is discre-
tionary with the bankruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). Sound policy dictates
that the court should avoid the inequity of subjecting thousands of timesharing pur-
chasers to financial loss and judicially hindering the development of a useful industry.
The court should not have created a distinction between the regulation of non-fee and
fee timesharing. Instead, it reasonably could have concluded that this interest falls
within the unexpired lease or sale of real property exemptions. See II U.S.C.
§ 365(h), (i) (1982).
235. See Dungan, supra note 229, at 4.
236. Although courts may determine that fee timesharing under an installment
purchase plan is executory, § 365 exemptions apply because fee timesharing confers a
recognized interest in real property. Cf. M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 5A-8.
237. Timesharing is a flexible concept. Throughout its short development in the
United States it has changed continually to meet legal and practical complications,
The desire to avoid the threat of partition in tenancy in common timesharing inspired
interval ownership. The developer's desire to avoid real estate licensing and to retain
equity spurred the growth of right-to-use timesharing. The conflict of whether non-
fee ownership is an interest in real property will serve as an impetus for further refine-
ment and restructuring. Some plans suggest including the proprietary right-to-use
and deeded right-to-use in timesharing contracts. See M. HENZE, supra note 4, § 5A-
9.
238. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-533, §§ 401-04, 98 Stat. 333, 366-67 (1984).
239. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. ON OMNIBUS BANKRUPTCY IMPROVEMENTS
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trustee still has the option to reject the contracts, the timesharing pur-
chaser can either treat the contract as terminated or may remain in
possession. 240 The recent legislation recognizes the difficulties in
construing non-fee timesharing and demonstrates the desire to pro-
tect the non-fee timesharing consumer consistently with the fee
timesharing consumer. 24' Nevertheless, timesharing consumers, de-
velopers, financiers, and commentators must wait to see if courts will
carry out consistently the spirit of the timesharing reforms.
IV. CONCLUSION
Real estate timesharing is quickly gaining popularity in the United
States. Although timesharing is a new development, it has both avid
supporters and fervent opponents. The success of timesharing at-
tracts both consumers and developers. The rapid development and
popularity of real estate timesharing increases the demand for regula-
tion. State statutes, agency regulations, and local controls are devices
to obtain this objective. Although regulatory implementation is slow,
the real concern, as the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984 demon-
strate, is consistent regulation of all timesharing formats. Consistent
regulation and construction of both fee and non-fee formats is neces-
sary to protect the timesharing industry, the financial institutions,
and the timesharing consumers.
Ac T OF 1983, S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 49 (1983) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP, No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.].
240. 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1). (2) (1982), amended by Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 401-04,
98 Stat. 333, 366-67 (1984). The amendment grants the timesharing consumer a lien
on the property if the contracts are rejected in bankruptcy. The Senate Judiciary
Committee reported that the purpose of the amendment is "to ... [indicate clearly]
that timeshare interests are to be treated in the same manner as leases and sales of real
property." S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 50.
241. S, REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 50. The report explains that non-fee
timesharing "interests are difficult to characterize within existing legal concepts
1. therefore.] it is necessary to extend the coverage of the existing consumer protec-
tions to . . . include them [explicitly]." Id.; cf. Bankruptcy Reform Hearings, supra
note 155. at 405 (testimony of Carl Berry, Chairman, National Timesharing Council
of the American Land Development Ass'n).
19841
Washington University Open Scholarship
0https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/6
